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Abstract
The 30 years since the enactment of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child has seen extensive developments in the theory and practice of children’s 
rights. Children’s rights are now an established academic discipline with the study of 
children in conflict with the law being a fundamental area of analysis. This paper takes 
the approach of highlighting three areas of development of children’s rights scholar-
ship in relation to the criminal justice system: children’s rights, developmental science 
and notable themes emerging from cross-national scholarship, including age limits, 
diversion, effective participation and deprivation of liberty. In addition, it analyses 
three gaps or challenges which are “left in the too-hard basket” for the coming 
decades.
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1 Introduction
The 30 years since the enactment of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (“the Convention” or “crc”) has seen extensive develop-
ments in the theory and practice of children’s rights. Children’s rights are now 
an established academic discipline, albeit ‘complex, dynamic, and relatively 
young’ (Kilkelly and Liefaard, 2019a) with the study of children in conflict with 
the law being a fundamental area of analysis. For example, a survey of articles 
published since the inception of this journal yields a wide variety of criminal 
justice-related topics, ranging from participation of children in court proceed-
ings (Rap, 2016) to capital punishment (Linde, 2011; James and Cecil, 2003–
2004; James, 2001). Jurisdiction-specific analyses are prevalent, with Canada 
(e.g. Trepanier and Tulkens, 1993; Pinero, 2009; Bendo and Mitchell, 2017), and 
Australia (e.g. O’Brien and Fitzgibbon, 2018; Nunez and Copeland, 2017; De 
Jonge, 1995) being the most prevalent.
It would be impossible within the parameters of this paper completely to 
cover the extensive developments in scholarship, or indeed the case-law and 
human rights jurisprudence across these three decades. This paper takes the 
approach of highlighting three areas of development of children’s rights schol-
arship in relation to the criminal justice system, and three gaps or challenges 
which are “left in the too-hard basket” for the coming decades. These are not 
exhaustive and undoubtedly reflect our personal areas of scholarship and geo-
graphical locations. We also recognise the dearth of global coverage in the 
scholarly literature (though note Banks, 2007; 2011; Ame, 2011 in this journal). 
and the primacy of the English language medium.
Finally, a note on terminology – we use the term children here in its Conven-
tion sense, referring to those aged less than 18, while noting that many jurisdic-
tions have lower ages of penal majority. We also note that one of the issues that 
we have identified is that some children accused of serious crimes are exclud-
ed from the youth justice system. Therefore, we have chosen to use the term 
“criminal justice system”, to recognise that not all children in conflict with the 
law benefit from a specialised youth justice system. We note also that the Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child has decided to advocate for the use of the 
term “child justice” – instead of “juvenile justice” or “youth justice” (GC No. 24., 
2019).
2 Key Developments for Children in Conflict with the Law
This section chooses three key areas of developments in scholarship relating 
to the rights of children in conflict with the law. These are the analysis of the 
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human rights framework for such children across three decades, the increasing 
emphasis on applying scientific understanding to law, practice and policy; and 
some notable themes of aspects of youth justice systems which emerge from 
cross-national scholarship.
2.1 Children’s Rights for Children in Conflict with the Law
The rights of children in conflict with the law are firmly embedded in interna-
tional human and children’s rights. Children’s rights form part of internation-
al and regional human rights law and reflect fundamental human rights no-
tions, such as the right to a fair trial, while adding child-specific components 
(Hollingsworth, 2013). Core children’s rights provisions, in particular articles 
40 and 37 of the Convention, revolve around the right of ‘every child alleged as, 
accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law’ (art. 40 (1), crc) to 
be treated fairly, with respect for fair trial rights including the presumption of 
innocence, the right to legal or other appropriate assistance and the right to a 
trial without delay (see art. 40 (2), crc), and in a manner that takes into ac-
count the child’s age and her or his best interests (Liefaard, 2015). Children’s 
rights for children in conflict with the law places states under the obligation to 
promote the child’s well-being, development and social reintegration, while 
reinforcing her or his respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
others (see also art. 29 (1), crc). To this end, states are required and have been 
stimulated to develop specific laws and policies for children in conflict with 
the law and invest in the specialisation of professionals (General Comment 
No. 10, para. 90ff.; see also the new General Comment No. 24, para. 105ff.), pro-
vide for measures without resorting to judicial proceedings – i.e. diversion – 
and set an age below which children cannot be held criminally responsible (i.e. 
the minimum age of criminal responsibility, macr) (art. 40 (3), crc). Although, 
the Convention itself does not provide for an age and the 1985 UN Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules) 
merely provide that the age ‘shall not be fixed at a too low an age level’ (rule 4.1), 
the UN Committee of the Rights of Child, for a long time, has advocated for a 
macr of 12 years of age, as the ‘international acceptable minimum’ (General 
Comment No. 10, para. 32). In its recent 24th General Comment on children’s 
rights in the child justice system, which replaces General Comment No. 10, the 
Committee calls for a macr of at least 14 years of age (para. 22). The Commit-
tee also ‘commends States parties that have a higher minimum age, for instance 
of 15 or 16 years of age, and urges States parties not to reduce the minimum age 
of criminal responsibility under any circumstances’ (para. 22).
The Committee furthermore underscores that all children, who were 
 under 18 at the time of committing the offence, should be granted the right to 
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the practice of transferring or waiver children to the adult court or to the adult 
penal system (General Comment No. 24, para. 30). It does so on the basis of the 
principle of non-discrimination, which has broader implications for the crimi-
nal justice system and relates to issues such as discrimination and disparities, 
status offences and stigmatisation (General Comment No. 24, para. 112; see also 
General Comment No. 10, para. 6–9). As far as sentencing and the use of depri-
vation of liberty is concerned, children’s rights standards advocate for lower 
sentences and, more importantly, child-sensitive dispositions (see General 
Comment No. 24 and art. 37 (a) and (c) and article 40 (4), crc) and call for the 
use of arrest, detention and imprisonment as a measure of last resort and for 
the shortest appropriate period of time (art. 37 (b), crc).
Scholarship has identified that human and children’s rights have stimulated 
law reform (see e.g. Zimring, Langer and Tanenhaus, 2015; see also Sloth-
Nielsen, 2001) and jurisprudence to secure treatment of children in conflict 
with the law in conformity with human rights (Skelton, 2018). In addition, it 
has been identified that the framework has generated further standard-setting 
in specific areas of criminal justice. The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, for example, has delivered ground-breaking jurisprudence in relation 
to street children and police violence, and the protection of children under 
arrest and in detention (Feria Tinta, 2015 with reference to the Villangrán Mo-
rales v. Guatemala case, among others). The Council of Europe, particularly 
through its European Court of Human Rights and its case law on children’s 
right to effective participation (Kilkelly, 2001; Rap, 2013; T & V v.UK cases), the 
right to legal assistance (Liefaard and Van den Brink, 2014; Salduz case and 
Panovits case) and the use of detention as a last resort and for the shortest pe-
riod of time (Van den Brink, 2018), and the Committee of Ministers, have devel-
oped specific instruments around child-friendly justice (Liefaard and Kilkelly, 
2018; cf. Sloth-Nielsen, 2015), the rights of children subjected to detention and 
community sentences and ‘new ways of dealing with juvenile delinquency’; 
the latter reflecting scientific insights regarding development of adolescents, 
including brain development (see below). In 2016, the European Union adopt-
ed a special directive on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects 
or accused persons in criminal proceedings, which is grounded in children’s 
rights and European human rights and is legally binding for EU member states 
(see Rap and Zlotnik, 2018).
In sum, children’s rights for children in conflict with the law have not only 
provided more clarity and guidance on the role and responsibilities of states 
for the protection of the rights and interests of children dealt with within 
the criminal justice system, it has also (further) stimulated law reform at the 
domestic level. Regional standard-setting and the activities of civil society 
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 organisations as well as UN special mandate holders, in particular the UN Spe-
cial Representative on Violence Against Children, around awareness raising 
and training of law makers, judges, prosecutors, law enforcement, social work-
ers and other professionals, have certainly contributed to this achievement. 
Unfortunately, this cannot be said for all parts of the world, primarily because 
of the absence of a regional human rights infrastructure. In addition, it should 
be noted that regressive trends towards juvenile delinquency, and crime more 
generally, in some countries show that the principles and rights laid down in 
the human rights framework are not without controversy (O’Brien and Fitzgib-
bon, 2018; Liefaard, forthcoming; Hollingsworth, 2016).
2.2 Developmental Science, Children and Criminal Justice
A different, though related, lens of scholarship is that of developmental psy-
chology (the terms “brain science” and “neuroscience” are also used). The ex-
tensive literature has been used successfully in advocacy and strategic litiga-
tion to temper the effect of punitive laws and policies, particularly in the 
United States (Steinberg and Scott, 2003). While the human rights lens and the 
scientific lens are different conceptions of children’s rights and interests, they 
arguably lead to a similar result – a recognition that it is right and justified to 
treat children in an age appropriate manner and to emphasise outcomes which 
recognise children’s lesser capacities for self-control and regulation, but their 
greater capacity for change and re-integration.
This body of scientific literature has been employed in two main contexts 
for children in conflict with the law. The first is evidence about the stages of 
brain development in children. Research emphasises children’s lesser stage of 
cognitive development, susceptibility to peer influence and risk-taking behav-
iour, and lesser capabilities for self-control and self-regulation (Grisso and 
Schwartz, 2000). Children’s brains are still developing until late adolescence or 
early adulthood. Their capacity for change and rehabilitation is considerable. 
International research projects have demonstrated that these findings are 
cross-cultural (Steinberg, 2009; Scott and Steinberg, 2008). In criminal cases, 
this evidence can be employed at both the liability assessment and the sen-
tencing stage. Recent United States decisions such as Miller v. Alabama (find-
ing mandatory life without parole to be unconstitutional) have relied heavily 
on scientific evidence of teenagers’ brain development to support an argument 
of lesser culpability (Monahan et al., 2015; Cohen and Casey, 2014). Further, 
children’s capacity for change and greater opportunities for re-integration jus-
tify finite and shorter sentences. Another use of brain development evidence is 
in the policy and law reform sphere. Here, it underpins arguments for higher 
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young adults, and the retention of the presumption of doli incapax (Steinberg, 
2009).
In the second context (which draws together the scientific and human rights 
lenses), there is increasing knowledge of the prevalence of cognitive difficul-
ties amongst the population of children in conflict with the law, particularly 
those children who commit serious offences. Cognitive difficulties may arise 
from traumatic brain injury, abuse and neglect, neuro-disabilities such as au-
tism, adhd, foetal alcohol spectrum disorders, intellectual disability and men-
tal illness. Children with these difficulties are highly over-represented in the 
criminal justice system, particularly in the custodial population (Hughes, 2012; 
Lynch, 2016). While all children may struggle with comprehension of complex 
legal processes simply as a result of their stage of development, children with 
cognitive difficulties face further barriers in the vindication of their rights 
to  effective and meaningful participation in particular, and also recognition 
of  their conditions as a mitigating factor in sentencing. Diagnosis is a key 
 issue, particularly as some of these conditions can manifest first as defiance 
or  a  child being non-compliant with requirements such as curfew or bail 
 conditions (Hand et al., 2016). Court processes can be improved through the 
use  of  communication assistance/intermediaries who use their expertise in 
speech and language to explain and interpret proceedings to children (Hoya-
no, 2015).
Scientific understanding provides standalone evidence for protective mea-
sures and mitigation for children in conflict with the law. It has been said that 
with increasing knowledge both of developmental psychology and the preva-
lence of cognitive difficulties in the youth justice population, we may look 
back at aspects of our contemporary laws, policy and practice for children in 
conflict in the law as being akin to asking a person in a wheelchair to run up 
the stairs (Becroft, quoted in Lynch, 2016). The literature has been used to pow-
erful effect in the United States, where the political and social context means 
that human rights are not a powerful argument for mitigation and protective 
measures for children (Rutkow and Lozman, 2006). It is possible that there are 
some fishhooks in basing protective measures purely on scientific evidence, 
rather than the universal application of human rights (Walsh, 2010). What if an 
assessment shows that a young child is capable of understanding and fully cul-
pable for their actions? That should not override the requirements in human 
rights standards for special measures for children. Traumatic brain injuries and 
other neuro-disabilities may also be used as a double-edged sword to class par-
ticular children as particularly risky and justify more restrictive measures 
(Freckleton, 2016). Again, the universality of the requirements for special mea-
sures must prevail (UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2019, para. 28).
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Though separate lenses, scientific findings are increasingly used in human 
rights analysis to justify protective measures for children. For instance, the re-
cent updated General Comment uses brain development evidence to justify 
the recommendation of a higher minimum age of criminal responsibility:
documented evidence in the fields of child development and neurosci-
ence indicates that maturity and the capacity for abstract reasoning is 
still evolving in children aged 12 to 13 years due to the fact that their fron-
tal cortex is still developing… States parties are encouraged to take note 
of recent scientific findings, and to increase their minimum age accord-
ingly, to at least 14 years of age (UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
2019, para. 22).
2.3 Children’s Rights in Youth Justice Systems – Cross-National Trends 
in Theory and Practice
2.3.1 Criminal Responsibility and Age Parameters
The minimum age of criminal responsibility, the age of penal majority and 
various age parameters are the subject of much scholarship. As discussed 
above, both the human rights lens and the scientific lens have been used to 
critique minimum ages of criminal responsibility (Morgan and Farmer, 2011; 
McDiarmid, 2013). Comparative analyses (e.g. Cipriani, 2016) are prevalent in 
the literature, though may fail to capture the particularities of individual sys-
tems. As discussed above, recently the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
has reached a firm consensus in relation to the age of 14 years (General Com-
ment, 2019, para. 22), regarding scientific findings as weighty:
States parties are encouraged to take note of recent scientific findings, 
and to increase their minimum age accordingly, to at least 14 years of age. 
Moreover, the developmental and neuroscience evidence indicates that 
adolescent brains continue to mature even beyond the teenage years, af-
fecting certain kinds of decision-making. Therefore, the Committee com-
mends States parties that have a higher minimum age, for instance 15 or 
16 years of age, and urges States parties not to reduce the minimum age 
of criminal responsibility under any circumstances.
Many states have forms of parental responsibility enshrined in law (Eekelaar, 
1991). Hollingsworth (2007) has explored the overlapping nature of the rights 
of the child and the rights of the parents under the English scheme for parental 
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2.3.2 Diversion, Alternatives and Restorative Justice
Diversion from prosecution is longstanding in national systems for children in 
conflict with the law. Diversion may mean simply that nothing further hap-
pens, or that a child is referred by the police or enforcement officer towards a 
programme – such as a referral to social services, educational or drug and alco-
hol services. Children may be required to make amends for the harm, such as 
paying small amounts of compensation or reparation, or doing community 
work.
A principled, consensual and well-delivered diversion process can have con-
siderable advantages for children’s rights and interests, delivering a resolution 
in line with a child’s sense of time, and providing a re-integrative outcome that 
addresses the child’s needs. The prevalent use of diversion may act to miti-
gate  somewhat the continued low minimum ages of criminal responsibility 
in many jurisdictions, by resolving the matter at the lowest level possible. Im-
portantly, diversion should ensure that a child does not have a criminal re-
cord which causes stigma and hinders future opportunities such as work and 
travel. There is rightly caution that children’s due process rights are protect-
ed, that such processes do not leave the child with a permanent record, and 
that children participate fully in the agreement to enter the process (Sands, 
2016).
Concurrent with the drafting and signing of the Convention in the late 
1980s, was the increasing popularity of restorative justice (RJ) processes. Re-
storative justice is broadly defined as a communitarian and participatory form 
of justice, which seeks to return control of a crime and its aftermath to the 
people involved, namely the alleged offender and the victim of the offence 
(Crawford and Newburn, 2013). Restoration and reconciliation are goals rather 
than retribution and deterrence, and decisions may be binding on participants 
or recommendatory to judicial officers (Morris and Maxwell, 2001). Models of 
restorative practice are widely used for children in conflict with the law. Preva-
lent especially is the family group conferencing model, which was pioneered in 
New Zealand (Maxwell and Morris, 2006). Scholarship has examined how RJ 
interacts with children’s rights. It can promote children’s rights (Moore and 
Mitchell, 2011). Moore (2008: 9) argues that –
the language of crc Article 40 is … largely indicative of the principles of 
restorative practice. Notions of respect, dignity, construction and reinte-
gration evoke restorative collaboration, community stakeholder involve-
ment, and dialogue – especially in combination with crc articles 2, 3, 6 
and 12.
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However, it is difficult to reconcile the best interests of the child standard 
with the victim-focused approach of restorative justice, and there are doubts 
as to whether some children have sufficient maturity for expressions of re-
morse (Lynch, 2010).
In a response to indigenous peoples’ desire for self-determination and at-
tempts to address the stark over-representation of indigenous children in the 
justice system, some jurisdictions have seen the establishment of specific 
courts for indigenous children and their families (Borowski, 2011). Austra-
lian jurisdictions’ courts are statutorily based, while the New Zealand model 
is  grassroots (or ‘flaxroots’), with local Maori communities partnering with 
judges to provide a culturally appropriate venue, process and outcome (Tau-
maunu, 2014). Such initiatives give effect to indigenous peoples’ rights to self- 
determination and practice of culture and have been endorsed by the recent 
updated General Comment.
2.3.3 Children’s Rights in Court Proceedings
As discussed, there is a cross-national trend towards some form of diversion 
for most children coming to notice for minor or moderate offending. This has 
the result that although the numbers being dealt with through charges in a 
formal court setting or eventual custodial disposition are low, these cases are 
the most complex in terms of both the offence and the child. When the prin-
ciples of diversion and “deprivation of liberty as a last resort” is employed thor-
oughly, children who eventuate in court or custody may have exhausted the 
available options and community placements over many years. Communica-
tion disorders, cognitive difficulties and mental health issues are prevalent 
amongst this population. Previous care history is often prevalent to the extent 
that the pipeline from care to custody seems ubiquitous and inevitable (Stan-
ley, 2017). Over-represented populations also include ethnic or social minori-
ties (Kempf-Leonard, 2007, Webster, 2018), children with immigrant status 
(Liddell et al., 2017) or refugee status and indigenous peoples (Cuneen, 2006). 
These smaller numbers also have the potential to transform practice in courts 
and custody from volume processing to evidence-based intervention. Thera-
peutic jurisprudence and problem-solving courts such as specialist drug courts 
and judicial monitoring are promising initiatives for promoting children’s rein-
tegration into society (Richards et al., 2017).
Scholarship on children’s rights in court proceedings has focussed on the 
difficulties of children participating in court proceedings. Courtroom design, 
attitude of professionals, timetables and language all inhibit the child’s rights 
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Daly and Rap, 2018). Strategies for effective participation can include special-
ised court staff and child-friendly language (fra, 2015). It has been said that 
‘authentic inclusion of children’s participation requires much more than a 
comfortable waiting room or a stuffed animal gift’ (Berrick et al., 2018). In 
bridging the theory to practice gap, a recent collection (Stalford, Hollingsworth 
and Gilmore, 2017) has extended the re-writing of judgments methodology pi-
oneered by feminist legal scholars to re-write a selection of judgments from a 
children’s rights perspective.
2.3.4 Children Deprived of Liberty
Children deprived of liberty has been an issue of concern for a long time. The 
Global Study on Children Deprived of Liberty, commissioned by the United 
Nations, has aimed to provide a better understanding of the phenomenon, in 
the context of criminal justice and beyond. It has targeted at identifying prom-
ising practices with regard to the prevention of arrest, detention or imprison-
ment, the promotion of diversion and non-custodial measures, and the protec-
tion of children deprived of liberty (UN Global Study, 2019; see also the full 
report published in November 2019). Key facts reported in this study include 
160,000–250,000 children in remand centres and prisons worldwide, overuse of 
pre-trial detention, reliance on repressive and punitive policies leading to ex-
cessive criminalisation, overrepresentation of certain groups of children, seri-
ous concerns about children’s rights and well-being.
Indeed, there are grave concerns about the widespread use of deprivation of 
liberty in the criminal justice and other systems, and there are numerous re-
port pointing at the absence of adequate prevention strategies, the lack of pro-
tection of children’s rights and freedoms, including a lack of protection against 
various forms of violence, and the negative impact of deprivation of liberty on 
children’s health, development, safety and reintegration (see e.g. Mendez, 
2015). It needs no explanation that these concerns relate to the very core of 
children’s rights and interests.
Yet, it remains important to highlight that the vast majority of interventions 
used in criminal justice systems across the globe have a non-custodial nature. 
In addition, the numbers of children deprived of liberty have fallen around the 
world, particularly in the past ten years. Even in countries that have a rather 
bad record in terms of the numbers of children being placed in detention or 
being imprisoned in whatever form, such as the United States of America and 
England, now show a steady decrease of the number of incarcerated children 
(see e.g. Bateman, 2012; aclu, 2019). This can certainly be regarded as a posi-
tive development although it also has implications for the complexity of the 
group of children that find themselves in detention (Hollingsworth, 2014; see 
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further below). Moreover, there remain significant concerns about disparities 
and inequalities in the context of detention, as well as the use of severe sen-
tences regarding children (see also below).
3 Gaps and Challenges for Children’s Rights
In this section we set out three challenges for the coming decades. Without 
disregarding that in many national systems there still are basic concerns with 
regard to children’s rights implementation (such as lack of adequate legisla-
tion, high reliance on detention and lack of resources), what are some of the 
difficult and complex issues which scholars and advocates for children must 
address?
3.1 From Critique to Reform – A Children’s Rights Compliant Approach 
to Serious Offending
Our knowledge of children’s offending patterns is that most offending commit-
ted by children falls into the minor to moderate range. Children’s offending is 
characterised mainly by property offences, anti-social behaviour, less serious 
assaults, status offences and traffic offences. A children’s rights compliant ap-
proach to such cases is one which is diversionary, tolerant and timely, and which 
addresses the criminogenic and welfare issues which have contributed to the 
offending (Article 40.1, Convention). The human rights framework for children 
provides considerable guidance on prevention of offending, early intervention 
and diversionary processes, emphasising the importance of reintegration.
Nonetheless, there is considerably less guidance on the principles, process 
and outcomes for children who commit very serious offences. By this term, we 
mean offences such as homicide, rape, terrorism and aggravated robbery and 
assault. These offences involve a high degree of harm and wrong. Even other-
wise progressive jurisdictions use an exclusionary approach, particularly for 
children accused or convicted of homicide. This may mean that all or part of 
the trial is held in the adult system, and that adult sentences such as life im-
prisonment are available and are imposed (Lynch, 2018). The effect of an adult 
trial on children is harsh, even where protective measures such as intermediar-
ies and special procedures are used. Opportunities for effective and meaning-
ful participation are likely to be limited, and timeframes between charge and 
resolution are not likely to be in line with a child’s sense of time. The use of 
indeterminate or lengthy sentences of imprisonment solely for retributive pur-
poses contravenes the requirements in the Convention to use detention as a 
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Scholarship in this area has rightly identified how punitive sentences con-
travene children’s rights (O’Brien and Fitz-Gibbon, 2016). Capital punishment 
(Linde, 2011; James and Cecil, 2003–4). However, there is less discussion of 
what a children’s rights approach to such cases involve. Grappling with a prin-
cipled approach to this issue involves consideration of what the public interest 
is in cases of offending by children and what weight should be placed on pub-
lic safety (Kay, Tisdall and Docherty, 1998; Covell and Howe, 1996). Further, the 
rights and interests of victims of crime within the framework of children’s 
rights standards requires further examination. This is particularly relevant 
where the victim or alleged victim of the offence is also a child. The interests 
and rights of both children, including their best interests, must be considered 
in these cases (Lynch, 2018).
As well as the conceptual issues to be considered and weighed, the opera-
tional and policy questions of what a children’s rights compliant approach 
looks like for serious cases must be addressed by scholars and advocates. If 
children’s rights scholars cannot say what a children’s rights compliant re-
sponse looks like – how can we advocate at a policy and government level for 
change? The punitive status quo is likely to persist unless viable alternatives 
which acknowledge the public’s legitimate interest in accountability for seri-
ous offending are proposed.
3.2 Addressing Over-Representation and Disparity of Outcomes for 
Minority Groups
As foreshadowed above, the most pressing and difficult challenge for children’s 
rights in the coming decades is the over-representation of certain groups of 
children in the criminal justice system. This is accompanied by disparity of 
outcomes of treatment.
Though the minority groups differ, the trends are depressingly similar in 
relation to ethnic and racial minorities:
– The Lammy Report (2017) in the United Kingdom reports that bame chil-
dren make up 41 per cent of those in custody, and that young black men are 
nine times more likely to be in custody than white young men;
– New Zealand’s latest court figures indicate that in 2018, Māori made up 63 
per cent of children and young people with charges finalised in court (Min-
istry of Justice, 2018);
– In the Netherlands, research suggests that children with a migrant back-
ground (among others, children with a Moroccan background) have a high-
er chance of remaining in pre-trial detention, while children with a non-
migrant background have a higher chance that their pre-trial detention will 
be suspended (Van den Brink et al., 2017);
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– In the United States, black children are highly over-represented at all stages 
of the justice system (Ghandnoosh, 2014).
Female children too face particular issues, with their offending seen to trans-
gress societal views on norms of femininity as well as the criminal law (Lynch, 
2014). The small numbers of female children in the criminal justice system 
also means that such children are often left worse off as specific and separate 
reintegrative and rehabilitative programmes are not available (Lynch, For-
tune, Ward et al., 2018). There are also growing concerns with regard to chil-
dren with (mental) disabilities and the way they are being treated within the 
justice system (Van den Brink et al., 2017). The causes of over-representation 
and disparity of outcomes are incredibly complex and cannot be disentangled 
from historical and contemporary societal factors such as colonialism, dis-
crimination and poverty of opportunity (De Jonge, 1995; Douglas and Walsh, 
2013).
Further, the increasing prevalence and lightly regulated development of the 
use of new technology for state surveillance, criminal justice processing and 
risk assessment is also concerning, and will require child-specific analysis of 
impact, particularly for minority children. For instance, the collection and re-
tention of dna has been recognised as having particular impacts on children’s 
bodily integrity, privacy and reintegration, and being particularly stigmatising 
on racial and ethnic minorities (Campbell and Lynch, 2012). In New Zealand, a 
recent issues paper released by the Law Commission reports that 67 per cent 
of the profiles of children and youth held on the databank are of Māori de-
scent, entrenching the bias and over-representation in the system (Law Com-
mission, 2019). Emerging state surveillance tools such as automatic facial rec-
ognition technology must be assessed for their impact on children. Digital 
worlds mean new sources of potential harm to children (Simpson) Children’s 
rights in a digital age of rapidly emerging technology is already a developing 
area of scholarship (Lievens et al., 2018; Livingstone and O’Neill, 2014).
3.3 Shifting Concepts of Childhood, Youth and Emerging Adulthood
Much literature on children in conflict with the law is concerned with the age 
parameters of the system. As we discuss above, there is no firm minimum age 
of criminal responsibility nor an age of penal majority mentioned in the Con-
vention, though children are defined as being those less than 18 (at the time of 
committing the offence). While many jurisdictions still need to ensure that all 
children aged less than 18 have the benefit of a specialised protective youth 
justice system, there has been a cross-national trend towards enactment or 
consideration of the extension of the youth justice system to include young 
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There are a number of drivers for this trend, including the extension of the 
social concept of adolescence. While in former times indicators of adulthood 
such as marriage, childbearing and entry into the workforce was likely to occur 
at much earlier ages, it is now accepted that young adults are often not inde-
pendent until their early to mid-twenties. Further, increased understanding of 
brain development in late adolescence has influenced policy. Also within the 
context of human rights, which builds on the notion that childhood ends at 
the age of 18, there seems to be a growing awareness around the importance of 
addressing the position of young adults. This has resulted in some specific 
guidance towards states on how to deal with children in transition from the 
juvenile into the criminal justice system (Liefaard, 2012). A positive aspect of 
increasing understanding of brain development is that young or emerging 
adults’ (a term used for those roughly between the ages of 18 and 25) vulnera-
bilities and lesser capacities are being recognised through law, policy and prac-
tice (Brewster, 2019). The vulnerability, lesser capacity and culpability of this 
group recognised through approaches like increasing the jurisdiction of the 
youth justice system or establishing a third system.
There are some challenges in these shifting concepts of childhood, youth 
and emerging adulthood. The development of these policies for lower-risk 
emerging adults coupled with the exclusion from protective measures of 
some children for serious offending may mean a categorisation of deserving/ 
undeserving or risky/not risky. This is compared to the “bright-line” test in chil-
dren’s rights standards of protective measures being predicated on the child’s 
age rather than their level of risk or seriousness of the offence. It is also worth 
considering whether there are any challenges for the wider field of children’s 
rights. In particular, is there a cognitive dissonance in children’s rights scholar-
ship, where in other fields such as education, medical decision-making, voice 
of the child, citizenship and gender identity, we consider and advocate that 
even young children are capable of exercising agency and autonomy and to 
appreciate the consequences of their proposed decisions (Hollingsworth, 
2007). Is this a consistent approach? Or is there a need for consistency? (Yaffe, 
2018).
4 Conclusion – Addressing the Challenges in the Next Decade
We have posed a number of challenges for scholars and advocates who are 
working in the area of the rights of children in conflict with the law. These are 
three examples from our perspective, but this list is not exhaustive. To con-
clude, we briefly consider how we think the children’s rights community 
should tackle these issues. To continue on a theme – we suggest three ways 
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that scholarship and advocacy can address these challenges, and the fresh 
challenges to come.
First, the value of comparative research and engagement. There is much to 
be learned from other jurisdictions, particularly between common law and 
civil law jurisdictions. There is also much to be learnt by Western scholars from 
engaging (appropriately and respectfully) with concepts and models from in-
digenous and other cultures (Libesman, 2007; Kaime, 2010), and with informal 
justice systems apparent in different parts of the world (see e.g. acpf, 2018). It 
is very useful to consider comparative aspects such as court orders available, 
but analysis needs to consider what the actual impact is on children, e.g. there 
may be different reasons for detention (retributive or child welfare or protec-
tive), but the effect on the child is the same in terms of deprivation of liberty.
Secondly, the value of interdisciplinary scholarship and engagement must 
be emphasised. As we better recognise the complexities of our population of 
children in conflict with the law, upholding their rights and ensuring child-
friendly justice will involve considering and applying knowledge from a range 
of scholarly disciplines, including medicine, public health, big data and eco-
nomics. In relation to this, we need to be aware of the ethical issues related to 
and political implications of our work, as well as of the potential implications 
of scientific insights for the consistency of our approaches to children and ado-
lescents (see the challenge related to shifting concepts of childhood and 
youth).
Thirdly, moving beyond critique into co-design is vital. It is relatively easy 
for scholars and advocates to critique law, policy and practice as being non-
compliant with children’s rights standards, but more difficult to work in bal-
ancing the various rights and interests inherent in law reform and policy for-
mation. Scholars and advocates for children must ensure that they are involved 
and engaged in policy and law reform, which should also include critical and 
independent evaluation (see also General Comment No. 24, para. 114, where 
the Committee recommends that States parties ensure regular evaluations 
of  their child justice systems, in particular of the effectiveness of the mea-
sures  taken, and in relation to matters such as discrimination, reintegration 
and patterns of offending, preferably carried out by independent academic 
institutions.).
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